Prosecuting Pluralism?
Accountability Institutions and Subnational Democracy in Colombia

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Abstract

This paper makes a first attempt to empirically investigate the allegation that Colombia's accountability institutions systematically and disproportionately investigate and sanction politicians who represent an alternative to the country's traditional parties. Leveraging data on all mayors in office between 2008-2019 and investigations and sanctions by the prosecutor general's office (Fiscalía) and inspector general's office (Procuraduría) we find mixed results: while alternative mayors are no more frequently investigated by either institution than traditional politicians, AI investigations and sanctions tend to cluster in urban areas, where most alternative local victories also occur: a confluence of factors we refer to as the "urban governance trap." We then draw on interviews from Colombia to illustrate how the urban governance trap may help explain why alternative politicians, under pressure from investigations and sanctions, have consistently struggled to build cohesive, nationally viable political parties.

Introduction

In 2013, Colombia's inspector-general's office, or Procuraduría, removed the country's leading opposition politician from office. Acting as both judge and jury, the watchdog agency accused the leftist mayor of Bogotá, Gustavo Petro, of committing "irregularities" while setting up a public trash collection service and banned him from participating in politics for 15 years. Petro responded by rallying thousands of his supporters to the capital city's central square, where he drew a straight line from the assasination of various reformist Colombian politicians during

the twentieth-century to his dismissal from office. The Procuraduría, Petro alleged, "continues this task today by manipulating norms, breaking the constitution and violating the rule of law."[1]

Petro's speech may have been unique in its fiery tone, but the allegation he made is an increasingly common one. Across Latin America, claims of "lawfare," or the use of legal institutions to persecute political rivals, are on the rise. Opposition figures in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador, among other cases, have accused their country's watchdog agencies and accountability institutions of acting on behalf of incumbents to settle political scores beyond the ballot box.[2] The notion of "lawfare" has largely been met with skepticism, and for good reason: elected officials under investigations have strong incentives to portray their legal entanglements as unfair political prosecution. Yet research on law and politics in developing democracies has shown that electoral conflict has led to increased investigation and prosecution of opposition, suggesting there may be merit to at least some of these claims (Ang 2019; Balán 2011; Popova 2012; Vadlamannati 2015). In July 2020, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights came to a similar conclusion, ruling that Petro's removal from office had in fact lacked basic "guarantees of impartiality and the presumption of innocence," and ultimately amounted to a violation of "the democratic process."[3]

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[1] See "Este es el discurso completo de Gustavo Petro en la Plaza de Bolívar," *El Espectador*, December 10, 2013, https://elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/este-es-el-discurso-completo-de-gustavo-petro-en-la-plaza-de-bolivar. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/este-es-el-discurso-completo-de-gustavo-petro-en-la-plaza-de-bolivar/

[2] For Brazil, see "Witzel ataca procuradora da PGR e a acusa de relacionamento próximo à família Bolsonaro", *Valor Económico*, August 28, 2020, https://valor.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/08/28/witzel-nega-atos-ilicitos-desafia-pgr-e-diz-que-interesses-poderosos-o-querem-longe-do-governo.ghtml; for Panama, see "La oposición pide a Panamá que deje de usar la Fiscalía para persecuciones políticas", *Europa Press*, August 3, 2016, https://.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-oposicion-pide-panama-deje-usar-fiscalia-persecuciones-politicas-20160803075324.html; for Uruguay, see "Oposición en el Senado denuncia persecución a intendentes no colorados", *Última Hora*, July 29, 2020, https://.ultimahora.com/oposicion-el-senado-denuncia-persecucion-intendentes-no-colorados-n2897345.html.

[3] See Inter'American Court of Human Rights, July 8, 2020, "Caso Petro Urrego Vs. Colombia," https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_406_esp.pdf.

This paper explores the "lawfare" hypothesis in Colombia, where allegations of politicized investigation, sanctioning, and prosecution of opposition have multiplied in recent years, especially concerning local politics. Like many other Latin American democracies, starting in the 1990s Colombia established a range of accountability institutions (AIs) to make elected officials answerable not only to voters but also "a network of relatively autonomous powers (…) that can call into question, and eventually punish" corruption and malfeasance (O'Donnell 1994, 61). Yet it is unclear whether AIs have fulfilled these functions in practice. Petro's case is by no means the only one in which "alternative" local political forces—a term we define in the next section—have cried foul. Others include a former university president who has served as mayor and governor and built an independent progressive movement in a region traditionally characterized by patronage politics (Carlos Caicedo in the department of Magdalena); a leftist leader who became mayor of a town controlled by a family clan with connections to right-wing paramilitaries (Marcelo Torres in Magangué, Bolívar); and a businessman who ran for mayor on an anti-corruption platform and defeated two traditional party candidates (Rodolfo Hernández in Bucaramanga, Santander). In each of these cases, alternative mayors faced a barrage of legal processes, investigations, and trials by Colombia's AIs, but it remains uncertain whether these cases form part of a larger pattern of politicized justice or not.

This paper is, to our knowledge, the first attempt at an empirical investigation of the alleged politicization of AIs against alternative subnational politicians in Colombia. At the present stage, it aims primarily to provide solid descriptive inferences about an important yet seriously understudied phenomenon—an indispensable though often undervalued step when developing a new research agenda (Gerring 2012). First, we contextualize the problem by

characterizing the actors and agencies involved. Second, we use data from two of the country's principal AIs (the Fiscalía, or public prosecutor's office, and the Procuraduría, or inspector general) on three mayoral terms (2008-2011, 2012-2015, and 2016-2019) to explore whether alternative mayors are disproportionately investigated and sanctioned. and whether the types of sanctions received by mayors varies in important ways according to their political affiliations.[4]

Our preliminary findings suggest the story is more complex than either the proponents of "lawfare" or their critics suggest. Among the full population of Colombian mayors (2008-2019), alternative mayors are, on average, no more likely to become the subject of Procuraduría and Fiscalía investigations than their traditional peers. These null findings are robust to limiting the sample to similar municipalities through nearest neighboring matching, as well as alternative specifications of the dependent variable. Instead, the only statistically significant predictors of investigations by both AIs are municipal population and local economic development (proxied by gross municipal product). However, it remains the case that alternative mayors primarily win office in urban, more developed municipalities.

In the last section of the paper, we rely on interviews to explore the consequences of AI investigations for local democracy. Specifically, we theorize that Colombia's institutional landscape produces what we refer to as an "urban governance trap": although alternative politicians are no more likely, on average, to face investigations and sanctions by merit of their political orientation, they disproportionately win office in large cities where scrutiny by AIs is the norm. The investigations and sanctions alternative politicians face, although more a product of political geography than politicized justice, can thus become serious obstacles to party-building,

[4] We focus on mayors rather than governors for three reasons: on account of the former's higher policymaking autonomy and control of resources, the fact that alternative politicians have made more extensive inroads at the municipal as opposed to departmental level, and to increase the number of available observations. Colombia has 1,103 municipalities and special districts (the local tier of government) and 32 departments (the intermediate tier).

and can fuel a *perception* (if not the reality) among their supporters that AIs are systematically biased and illegitimate. We conclude by discussing the limits of our data at present and our plans for next steps.

Colombia's "Alternative" Mayors

A novel feature of Colombia's political context is that critics allege AIs target not only national opposition leaders, but also alternative political forces on the local level. The public focus on local-level investigations and sanctions has coincided with the emergence of subnational government as strategic sites of conflict between left-leaning parties, ethnic movements, and other independent leaders and traditionally dominant right-of-center and right-wing forces (Chilito 2018; Eaton 2020; Laurent 2010; Pino, Pantoja, and López 2020). Much like the earlier experience of Latin American countries (Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011; Eaton 2017; Goldfrank and Schrank 2009), local government in Colombia is becoming both an important springboard for new parties and movements aspiring to higher office and as an arena for developing and implementing policies that challenge traditional economic models and political practices.

This development can be attributed in part to political decentralization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but perhaps even more to the country's relative pacification since the mid-2000s. Early challenges to traditional elite control of regional political power—such as the leftist Patriotic Union and a number of self-styled "civic" movements, both of which won several mayoralties in the 1980s and 90s—were met with brutal violence (Carroll 2011; Fergusson et al. 2020; Gutiérrez Sanín 2014; Romero 2003). However, the official demobilization of right-wing paramilitaries in 2006 and the subsequent weakening of their regional political alliances as a result of the *parapolítica* scandal (Eaton and Prieto 2017; López 2010) led to a decrease in violence

against elected officials and political candidates (see Cubaque 2011; Alonso 2015). Still, alternative leaders like Gustavo Petro allege that traditional elites have developed other weapons in their attempt to hold onto power by politicizing AIs.

We use the term "alternative" in keeping with its usage in Colombia,[5] though the concept is similar to Barr's (2009) usage of "outsider" in terms of a politician's location relative to the political establishment and party system. Yet we believe that "alternative" is a better term for describing local forces that challenge the political status quo than "outsider" in the Colombian context because many leaders of these forces are not new to the country's party system.[6] We do not limit our analysis to opposition parties for two reasons. First, the term "opposition" only acquired a clear institutional meaning in Colombia in 2018, with the enactment of the Opposition Statute. Second, and most importantly, national-level government and opposition alignments often do not map neatly onto subnational ones. Only one party, the leftist Alternative Democratic Pole (*Polo Democrático Alternativo*), can be said to be consistently an opposition party across all levels of government. Others, like the centuries-old Liberal Party, declared itself to be in the opposition during Álvaro Uribe's two presidential terms (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), but it retained its alignment with dominant political clans and families in most of the country's regions. By contrast, the center-left Green Alliance Party (*Partido Alianza Verde*) was part of Juan Manuel Santos's government during his second term (2014-2018), but in local elections it consistently backed candidates who opposed traditional elites.

We direct our focus toward leaders and movements who have disrupted what Behrend (2011) calls subnational "closed games" or what Slater (2013) refers to as oligarchic politics.

[5] See, e.g., "Personajes del año 2019: El poder de los alternativos," *El Espectador*, December 7, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/el-poder-de-los-alternativos.

[6] For example, Magangué's Marcelo Torres, the former alternative mayor of Magangue mentioned earlier, has been active in Colombian party politics since the 1980 as a member of several well-established leftist parties.

Subnational politics in Colombia has traditionally been characterized by such *de facto* local regimes, in which a small number of political families or clans dominate the local economy and state. Historically, these family clans have maintained power through widespread use of patronage, influence in business and regional media, and, at various points, alliances with armed groups to enforce voters' compliance (Eaton and Prieto 2017; Gutiérrez Sanín 2014; Leal and Dávila 1990). Even as the traditional Liberal-Conservative two-party system has splintered, many parts of the country remain under the grip of these regional power networks (González 2014; Gutiérrez Sanín 2014).[7]

Still, as Behrend (2011, 155) has underscored, "closed games" are never absolutely closed. Despite the persistence of Colombia's oligarchic political order on the national level and in most regions, challengers have gradually made local electoral gains over the last three decades. In a growing number of cities and departments, they have defeated elite-run political machines, allowing more inclusive patterns of electoral competition to take root. In addition to the significant but short-lived experiences of the Patriotic Union and regional civic movements soon after political decentralization, some indigenous parties began to win mayoral elections in the mid-1990s against traditional politicians in localities with large indigenous populations (Laurent 2010). In Bogotá, the country's capital, as well as Barranquilla, challengers began to defeat dominant, elite-run political machines in the 1990s (Moncada 2016; Pasotti 2010). "Alternative" victories then took place in the 2000s in Medellín and Cali (Colombia's second- and third-largest

[7] The 1958 National Front power-sharing agreement guaranteed traditional forces hegemony on the local level by splitting local offices evenly between Liberals and Conservatives down to the municipal level. Although the pact formally ended in 1974 and a 1986 reform instituted the direct election of mayors, many traditional politicians simply rebranded themselves and their local political machines using new party labels, limiting space for alternative forces on the local level until very recently (Gutiérrez Sanín 2007; Roberts 2014).

cities), and continued to spread to a number of department capitals and smaller regional cities across the country, especially after the 2007 local elections.

To summarize, subnational "alternative" leaders in Colombia are defined, above all else, by what they are *not*. They are not part of their regions' traditional oligarchic political machines, and they do not have the backing of the country's dominant parties—neither the traditional Liberals or Conservatives nor their post-1991 offshoots.[8] Although many political leaders and parties in Colombia that are discussed as "alternative" could be identified as left or center-left, there are important exceptions. Given the historical exclusion of the left from Colombia's political system, being a leftist is a sufficient but not necessary condition for being considered alternative. Indeed, some of the country's most prominent "alternative" figures—especially those that have resisted joining an existing party, choosing instead to create new personalistic movements, like Medellín's Sergio Fajardo (2003-2007) or Bucaramanga's Rodolfo Hernández (2016-2019)—have espoused broad anti-corruption or anti-elite platforms that are nevertheless ideologically ambiguous. The ideological platforms of some of the indigenous leaders that have defeated traditional regional clans are also difficult to pin down on a left-right spectrum. Despite these ideological differences, alternatives face similar disadvantages when challenging dominant local family clans. By their own account, a key disadvantage is finding themselves on the receiving end of politicized AI investigations.

Accountability Institutions in Colombia

Colombia's 1991 Constitution established a web of accountability institutions: the Contraloría (Comptroller-General), Procuraduría (Inspector-General), and Fiscalía (Prosecutor General), summarized in Table 1. While all three institutions have powers to enforce different

[8] We explain our coding rules in more detail in the next section.

parts of the law and have distinct territorial structures, they share the responsibility for investigating and punishing official wrongdoing.[9] The Fiscalía is the most centralized of the three, with the top prosecutor, or Attorney General, appointing all regional officials. It has the power to investigate violations of criminal law, including Colombia's anti-corruption statute, and place suspects under pretrial detention but leaves sentencing to judges.

The Procuraduría, by contrast, investigates violations of Colombia's administrative law, or the "disciplinary code." While the forms of wrongdoing it monitors are typically less severe, the Procuraduría has significant sanctioning power, including the ability to fine, suspend or remove officials from office, or ban them from participating in politics for years. Like the Fiscalía, its territorial structure is centralized, with the Inspector-General appointing all regional offices, yet it also encompasses a decentralized system of local legal offices (*Personerías*) appointed by municipal councils and tasked with administrative oversight. Meanwhile, the Contraloría audits public budgets, punishes fiscal mismanagement with fines, and passes information to the other two AIs, and its local directors are directly appointed by city councils. While the ability of all three institutions to monitor and sanction wrongdoing was overshadowed by Colombia's armed conflict for over a decade after their creation, they became increasingly active on the local level as conflict began to subside in the late 2000s, particularly in the wake of the parapolítica scandal.

[9] The Attorney-General is selected by the Supreme Court from a three-person list provided by the President. The Inspector-General is chosen by the Senate from a list of three candidates provided by the President and two of the high courts. The Comptroller-General was originally chosen by the two houses of Congress from a three-candidate list handed down by the high courts, but since 2015 is selected by Congress from a list of eligible candidates resulting from a formally meritocratic selection process. All three officials serve for four-year, non-renewable terms.

Table 1. Colombia's Accountability Institutions (AIs)

	Fiscalía (Attorney-General)	**Procuraduría** (Inspector-General)	**Contraloría** (Comptroller-General)
Purpose	Criminal investigation and prosecution	Administrative discipline	Fiscal control
Anti-corruption activities	• Investigates and charges public officials with violations of the criminal code • Directs the judicial police and can order the capture of public officials, up to 15 years' detention (pending judicial approval), and removal from public office	• Investigates and rules on violations of administrative law/disciplinary code • Imposes disciplinary sanctions including fines, suspension and removal from office, and bans on running for office for up to 20 years	• Conducts retroactive audits of public procurement, budgets, and revenues • Imposes fines for fiscal mismanagement • Issues reports including fiscal, disciplinary, and criminal findings and sends them to other two agencies
Territorial structure	**Centralized** • National Attorney-General • 34 regional offices and special units (including anti-corruption)	**Centralized but closely tied to decentralized structure of municipal Personerías** • National Inspector General • 32 regional (departmental) offices appointed by national Procuraduría • 52 offices in cities with over 100,000 inhabitants	**Decentralized** • National Office of the Comptroller General • 67 territorial contralorías (one in each department and 35 municipal or district contralorías)
Appointment procedure & budget autonomy	• Attorney General selected by Supreme Court from three-person list provided by President • Regional offices appointed by national Attorney General • Budget autonomy	• National Inspector-General selected by Senate from three-person list provided by President and high courts for four-year term • Regional Inspectors General named by National Inspector General's office • Municipal Personeros appointed by majority vote on municipal council • No budget autonomy	• National Comptroller-General selected by Congress for a four-year term from a list of ten eligible candidates based on a merit-based selection process • Departmental and local comptrollers selected by majority vote in the departmental assembly or municipal council • No budget autonomy

In this paper, we focus exclusively on the Procuraduría and Fiscalía for both substantive and methodological reasons. While there is a broad consensus the Contraloría is thoroughly captured by local elites given the conflict of interest—so much so that several attempts have been made to reform or even eliminate local Contralorías—whether the Procuraduría and Fiscalía are politically biased is still contested. These two institutions also have the power to trigger much

more politically consequential sanctions and their activities receive a much greater share of media attention. Methodologically, focusing on the Procuraduría and Fiscalía eases data collection problems. While each regional Contraloría keeps its own records, the other two AIs maintain national databases of investigations and sanctions. Despite their prominent role in Colombian politics, neither the Fiscalía nor the Procuraduría have been the subject of much empirical study, and no existing studies contemplate the role partisanship of implicated politicians may play in influencing their investigatory and sanctioning behavior. [10] In the next strategy, we explain how we make a first empirical attempt to map the landscape.

Data & Methodology

To better understand patterns of investigations and sanctions, we gathered data on all elected mayors in Colombia over the past three electoral terms (2008-2011, 2012-2015, and 2016-2019). We include both those mayors who served full terms as well as those who were elected in special elections (*elecciones atípicas*) to fill a vacancy.[11] We use election data from Colombia's national electoral authority, the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (compiled by Pachón and Sánchez 2014), which includes every mayor's party affiliation. Since these datasets do not cover special elections, we hand-coded every mayor elected in *atípicas* based on

[10] Important exceptions include Ruiz (2018), who finds that 2.5% of municipal mayors received disciplinary sanctions after entering office, and Martínez (2019), who finds that nearly half of procuraduría investigations between 2003 and 2011 ended with removal from office or a multi-year ban from politics. Ortiz Escobar and Calixto Rodríguez (2018) find corruption sentences by the Fiscalía are weakly correlated with the transparency of local governments.

[11] We treat interim mayors (*alcaldes encargados*) differently. There are two types of interim mayors: one is appointed provisionally by the governor of the department where the municipality is located (or, in the case of Bogotá, by the President) while a special election is held or while the second type of interim mayor is appointed. Special elections are only held if a vacancy occurs more than 18 months prior to the next regular election. The second type of interim mayor is named by the governor or the President from a short list of candidates provided by the parties who sponsored the original mayor. Mayors of the first type are not included in our sample. Those of the second type are treated as extensions of the original mayor's term, given their same party affiliation.

lists available on the Registraduría's website.[12] Our dataset includes 3,383 mayors (3,310 elected in regular elections and 73 in *atípicas*).

We coded the alternative or traditional political orientation of mayors—our key independent variable of interest—following a three step process. First, we coded as "traditional" all mayors affiliated with the Liberal or Conservative parties or any of their partisan offshoots.[13] We also code mayors who ran under the banner of former President Álvaro Uribe's Democratic Center (*Centro Democrático*, created in 2013) as traditional for two reasons. First, despite being in the national opposition to the administration of Juan Manuel Santos at the time of the 2015 elections, at the subnational level Centro Democrático forged multiple alliances with the government-aligned traditional parties (all of which had been part of Uribe's coalition during his two terms).[14] Moreover, even in places where Centro Democrático competed against the national government's local allies, its candidates have been closely tied to the traditional landed elites historically at the center of the country's subnational closed games.

Second, we coded easily identifiable alternative mayors, based on party affiliation. We began by coding every Polo Democrático mayor as alternative, on account of that party's unambiguous left identity and the fact that it did not form any coalitions with traditional parties during the period under study. We also code as alternative every mayor affiliated with the

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[12] For 2011-2018, see "Histórico de Elecciones: Elecciones Atípicas," *Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil*, https://www.registraduria.gov.co/-Atipicas-2011-.html. For 2008-2010, see "52 elecciones atípicas ha organizado la Registraduría desde el 2008," *Nuestra Huella: Revista Electrónica Mensual*, no. 74, January 2011, https://www.registraduria.gov.co/rev_electro/2011/rev_elec_ene/revista_ene2010.html.

[13] These include the Social Party of National Unity (better known as Partido de la U), the Radical Change Party (*Cambio Radical*), and Citizen Convergence (*Convergencia Ciudadana*, later renamed National Integration Party, or PIN, and now Citizens' Option, *Opción Ciudadana*). They also included the now-extinct Democratic Colombia Party (*Colombia Democrática*), Alas Equipo Colombia, Democratic Opening (*Apertura Democrática*), and the Inclusion and Opportunities Movement (*Movimiento de Inclusión y Oportunidades*, MIO)—all of which are considered regional "political microenterprises" with close ties to right-wing paramilitary groups (Albarracín, Gamboa, and Mainwaring 2018; López 2010).

[14] "El uribismo se sigue untando de Unidad Nacional," *La Silla Vacía*, August 18, 2015, https://lasillavacia.com/queridodiario/el-uribismo-se-sigue-untando-de-unidad-nacional-51159.

Indigenous and Social Alternative Movement (*Movimiento Alternativo Indígena y Social*, MAIS), a party created in 2013 by the left-leaning Indigenous National Organization of Colombia (ONIC). However, MAIS mayors who ran in coalition with a traditional party were coded as traditional. For Partido Verde (renamed Partido Alianza Verde in 2015), we automatically coded all of its mayors for the 2012-2015 and 2016-2019 as alternatives (except for those who ran in coalition with traditional parties), but hand-coded its mayors for the 2008-2011 term as explained below. Prior to 2010, when Partido Verde became the party of former alternative Bogotá mayors Antanas Mockus, Enrique Peñalosa, and Lucho Garzón, the party (then known as Partido Verde–Opción Centro, PVOC) functioned in some parts of the country as a catch-all organization with ties to traditional local elites. We therefore treated all 22 of that party's mayors elected in 2007 as uncertain in terms of their alternative or traditional status and included them in the third step of our coding process.

Party-based coding left us with 437 mayors whose alternative or traditional status was uncertain. These included the PVOC's 22 mayors, 195 mayors affiliated to indigenous or Afro-descendant parties other than MAIS, and 220 mayors who ran as independents by collecting a certain number of signatures and were not formally affiliated to a recognized political party. Nominally ethnic parties like the Indigenous Social Alliance (later renamed Independent Social Alliance, ASI), the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia (AICO), or the Afro-Colombian Social Alliance (ASA) usually serve as vehicles for a wide array of candidates, and thus also required hand-coding (Htun 2016; Laurent 2010). Unlike MAIS, which only tends to primarily lend its party label to left-leaning candidates, these other ethnic parties have looser vetting processes. While ASI, for instance, rose to prominence outside regions with large indigenous populations by lending its party credentials to well-known alternative leaders like Antanas Mockus and Sergio

Fajardo, it has also backed many traditional politicians, including some with ties to criminal groups (Ávila and Velasco 2011).

To classify these uncertain cases, we hand-coded each of the 437 ambiguous mayors. If we identified that mayors were sponsored by or affiliated with traditional parties or the dominant department-level political families and clans, we scored them as traditional. If we found evidence that individuals explicitly ran in opposition to these forces or identified connections to the alternative sectors discussed above, we classified mayors as alternative. If our findings on a given mayor were inconclusive due to lack of information (which occurred in 129 instances), we classified them as traditional.[15] We relied on multiple sources for this coding process, including academic studies of regional politics, reports by non-governmental organizations,[16] political party websites (many of which provide official documents listing the candidates they were backing for particular elections, even when those candidates did not carry their party label), online national and regional news reports, and publicly available social media accounts of individual candidates and regional party directorates.[17] The resulting dataset includes 3,085 traditional and 298 alternative mayors, or 8.8% of the sample: a portion that remains relatively consistent across electoral cycles, although it increases slightly each term.

We then gathered data on investigations and sanctions against mayors by petitioning the Procuarduría and Fiscalía using access to information requests. Data on Fiscalía and Procuraduría *investigations* were easily matched to mayors by name, year, and municipal code.

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[15] Robustness checks show that coding these low information mayors as alternative does not affect our results.

[16] Some key resources were the department-level monographs covering the 1997-2007 period compiled by the Misión de Observación Electoral (https://moe.org.co/home/doc/moe_mre/CD/PDF) as well as analyses by the Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris and Fundación Paz y Reconciliación.

[17] Social media accounts provided considerable evidence of political alliances, such as photos from campaign events showing a nominally independent candidate surrounded by traditional party flags and banners or receiving expressions of support from a traditional party boss.

However, more fine-grained data on *sanctions* administered by the Procuraduría are stored in a separate national database that employs a distinct case ID system from the sanctions database for a significant portion of cases. Unfortunately, it has so far proven impossible to match procuraduría sanctions, such as bans on participating in politics and removal from office, to AI investigations, so in this paper we focus exclusively on the latter.

However, this does not take away from the importance of investigations, which matter in their own right. As our interviews attest, simply the opening of an AI investigation can lead to reputational and financial costs for mayors and result in serious consequences for local politics. Finally, we collected data on municipal characteristics that could plausibly influence the local performance of rule of law institutions: several measures of local government transparency from the *índice de gobierno abierto*,[18] municipal population,[19] a municipal government performance score, external revenue streams including natural resource royalties and central transfers, gross municipal product as a proxy for economic performance, and the distance in kilometers from the municipality's department capital.[20]

Analysis

Analysis of our full sample of mayors provided evidence against the hypothesis that alternative mayors are, on average, subject to more Procuraduría and Fiscalía investigations than traditional mayors. Overall, Procuraduría sanctions are much more common than Fiscalía

[18] We employ both the aggregate IGA scores for municipalities and the municipal IGA measures for "control interno" to capture horizontal accountability and contract visibility, as a proxy for a common source of local level corruption.

[19] For all our analyses, we log municipal population.

[20] With the exception of the municipal government performance score, all of these data are drawn from the Terridata platform run by the National Planning Department (DNP 2020), which compiles data on municipal characteristics from various government datasets. The municipal performance score comes from DNP (2019) and is calculated by factoring a municipality's administrative and fiscal capacity, its compliance with legal requirements for the investment of central government transfers, and its performance in terms of public service provision.

investigations across both categories of mayor. Strikingly, mayors in our sample experienced on average 16 investigations during their municipal terms, although a handful were subject to a much higher number.



By comparison, only 475 mayors (14%) of our sample were investigated at least once by the Fiscalía. Of this group, 57 (or 12%) were alternative mayors—a higher portion than alternatives accounted for in the full dataset (8.8%). Moreover, alternative mayors investigated by the Fiscalía had 2 investigations on average, while traditional mayors had just 1.65. Variation, however, was limited to the number of investigations *opened*, as only a very small portion (2.2%) of Fiscalía investigations into mayors launched since 2008 had by July 2020 ended in sentencing. The table below (Fig. 1) displays the mean number of both types of investigations per mayor per term across the two political categories, as well as the characteristics of an average municipality governed by a traditional and alternative mayor, respectively.[21]

[21] We acknowledge that the standard errors for these group means are exceptionally large, suggesting an omitted variable may be driving differences between alternative and traditional mayors.

Table 1: Mayor Sanctions & Municipality Characteristics (Traditional = 0, Alternative = 1)

	0 (N=3085)	1 (N=298)	Total (N=3383)
Procuraduría investigations per mayor			
Mean (SD)	16.61 (17.08)	17.01 (22.88)	16.65 (17.67)
Fiscalía investigations per mayor			
Mean (SD)	0.22 (0.92)	0.38 (1.21)	0.24 (0.95)
Municipal Population (in thousands)			
Mean (SD)	36.81 (174.68)	116.69 (640.79)	43.84 (253.76)
Municipal Performance			
Mean (SD)	63.21 (15.16)	67.00 (16.24)	63.54 (15.29)
Royalties Income (per capita, in thousands)			
Mean (SD)	51.41 (83.28)	52.25 (108.94)	51.49 (85.83)
Gross Municipal Product (per capita, in 100 thousands)			
Mean (SD)	133.87 (163.60)	143.85 (240.33)	134.75 (171.72)
Transfers (per capita, in thousands)			
Mean (SD)	604.59 (365.28)	579.68 (332.92)	602.39 (362.57)
Open Government Index (IGA), Aggregate			
Mean (SD)	61.08 (12.00)	63.42 (11.34)	61.29 (11.96)
IGA, Internal Control			
Mean (SD)	64.08 (20.46)	65.78 (19.37)	64.23 (20.37)
IGA, Contracting Visibility			
Mean (SD)	56.67 (29.68)	65.40 (29.53)	57.44 (29.77)
IGA, Accountability			
Mean (SD)	46.34 (29.39)	48.57 (29.23)	46.50 (29.38)
IGA, Citizen Attention			
Mean (SD)	54.73 (28.06)	63.25 (27.15)	55.31 (28.07)
Voter Fraud Risk (1-3)			
Mean (SD)	0.34 (0.59)	0.30 (0.57)	0.34 (0.59)
Distance to dept. capital (km)			
Mean (SD)	79.95 (57.01)	72.02 (50.69)	79.25 (56.52)

To determine whether alternative mayors are, on average, more frequently investigated than their traditional peers, we used zero inflated negative binomial models: an appropriate choice given the zero-inflated distribution of our count response variables, number of Fiscalía investigations and number of Procuraduría investigations per mayor per term. Table 2 displays the results of modeling the number of Procuraduría investigations per mayor per term: being alternative is not statistically significantly associated with a greater number of investigations, on average, across any of our model specifications. Instead, in full form, other municipal characteristics are statistically significantly associated with Procuraduría investigations:[22] on

[22] In our analyses, population, royalty income per capita, PIB per capita and transfers per capita are logged.

average, mayors in municipalities with larger populations, higher gross municipal product (PIB), worse municipal performance scores and lower transparency that are further from department capitals are more likely to face additional Procuraduría investigations.

Fiscalía investigations (Table 3) seem to follow a somewhat similar pattern. Although being alternative is positively statistically significant with a mayor's number of Fiscalía investigations across our first three model specifications, this association disappears once controlling for municipal characteristics such as population and PIB. In full form (model specification 5), only population and PIB are positively associated with additional Fiscalía investigation at conventional levels of confidence, while distance from capital is negatively associated, as is a municipality's visibility in public contracting (although for this last variable, effect sizes are very marginal).

Across both AIs, the null finding that, on average, alternatives do not face a greater number of investigations compared to their traditional peers holds up to several robustness checks. We implemented nearest neighbor matching to address possible heterogeneity in the type of municipalities that elect alternative mayors as well as alternative specifications of the dependent variables, but neither robustness check changes our null findings (for more information, see Appendix).[23] Alternative specifications of our independent variable of interest, "alternative mayors," also failed to change our results.[24]

[23] To account for possible endogeneity concerns, we implemented nearest neighbor matching on the covariates statistically significantly associated with alternative mayors: municipal population, government performance, resource royalties, and gross municipal product. Subsequently, we used this sample (n = 594) to regress the number of each type of investigation per mayor per term on political affiliation (alternative or traditional), incorporating each of our controls, using logit models.

[24] We substituted dummy variables for each major leftist party (Polo Democrático, Verde, and MAIS) for our main "Alternative Mayors" predictor variable, and expanded this category to include independent mayors for whom we could not find sufficient information to code as alternative. However, none of these predictors was statistically significantly associated with AI investigations.

Table 2: Determinants of Mayor Investigations by the Procuraduría

	Number of procuraduría investigations per mayor				
	Alternative Mayors	Aggregate IGA	Additional IGA Controls	Demographic Controls	Interaction Term
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Alternative Mayor	0.024 (0.055)	0.057 (0.054)	0.064 (0.053)	−0.097* (0.049)	−0.253 (0.270)
Aggregate IGA		−0.013*** (0.001)	−0.005* (0.002)	−0.008*** (0.002)	−0.008*** (0.002)
Internal Control			0.002** (0.001)	−0.0001 (0.001)	−0.0001 (0.001)
Contract Visibility			−0.006*** (0.001)	−0.005*** (0.001)	−0.005*** (0.001)
Population				0.311*** (0.015)	0.311*** (0.015)
Municipal Performance				−0.009*** (0.001)	−0.009*** (0.001)
Royalties				−0.014 (0.009)	−0.014 (0.009)
PIB				0.188*** (0.023)	0.188*** (0.023)
Transfers				0.035 (0.037)	0.035 (0.037)
Distance from capitol				−0.0005* (0.0002)	−0.0005* (0.0002)
Aggregate IGA:Alternative Mayor					0.002 (0.004)
Constant	2.810*** (0.016)	3.617*** (0.079)	3.301*** (0.087)	−2.143** (0.758)	−2.122** (0.759)
Observations	3,383	3,382	3,382	3,380	3,380
Log Likelihood	−12,934.460	−12,868.150	−12,820.500	−12,389.420	−12,389.270
θ	1.327*** (0.033)	1.374*** (0.034)	1.412*** (0.035)	1.831*** (0.049)	1.831*** (0.049)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	25,872.910	25,742.300	25,651.000	24,800.850	24,802.530
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001				

Table 3: Determinants of Mayor Investigations by the Fiscalía

	Number of Fiscalía investigations per mayor				
	Alternative Mayors	Aggregate IGA	Additional IGA Controls	Demographic Controls	Interaction Term
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Alternative Mayor	0.524** (0.177)	0.532** (0.177)	0.548** (0.177)	0.294 (0.166)	0.196 (0.873)
Aggregate IGA		−0.003 (0.005)	0.009 (0.008)	−0.014 (0.007)	−0.014 (0.007)
Internal Control			0.005 (0.003)	0.0004 (0.003)	0.0004 (0.003)
Contract Visibility			−0.010*** (0.003)	−0.005* (0.003)	−0.005* (0.003)
Population				0.543*** (0.045)	0.543*** (0.045)
Municipal Performance				−0.005 (0.004)	−0.005 (0.004)
Royalties				−0.037 (0.027)	−0.037 (0.027)
PIB				0.333*** (0.083)	0.333*** (0.083)
Transfers				0.087 (0.129)	0.087 (0.129)
Distance from capitol				−0.003** (0.001)	−0.003** (0.001)
Aggregate IGA:Alternative Mayor					0.002 (0.014)
Constant	−1.493*** (0.057)	−1.281*** (0.282)	−1.835*** (0.316)	−11.148*** (2.559)	−11.132*** (2.565)
Observations	3,383	3,382	3,382	3,380	3,380
Log Likelihood	−1,891.654	−1,891.187	−1,880.080	−1,760.797	−1,760.792
θ	0.175*** (0.015)	0.175*** (0.015)	0.184*** (0.016)	0.337*** (0.035)	0.337*** (0.035)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,787.308	3,788.373	3,770.161	3,543.594	3,545.583
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001				

The picture that emerges from these results is that Colombia's AIs are most active in populous, economically vibrant cities, rather than against politicians on a certain side of the political spectrum. However, these are exactly the type of municipalities where alternative political forces are most likely to win office and govern. On its face, then, the observed tendency of AIs to investigate and sanction alternative mayors is simply the result of a selection effect: alternative politicians are more likely to win office in localities where AIs happen to be functional and meaningfully present.[25]

The Urban Governance Trap

For the literature on subnational politics, populous cities are where political alternatives are forged. As Edward Gibson (2012, 152) puts it, "the city is the hotbed of competitive politics and the key to the development of competitive party systems." Addressing rebel groups that turn to electoral politics specifically, but making a broader point, Alisha Holland has argued that subnational office seeking and holding municipal office can help new political forces establish a reputation for governance (Holland 2016). As Eaton (2020, 1) explains, dense grassroots networks and strong unions in Latin American cities "created significant urban opportunities for the left after the withdrawal of military regimes." Indeed, in several countries, local governments have served both as a strategic springboard for leaders aspiring to higher office as well as a platform for developing and implementing policies that challenge dominant economic models and traditional political forces (Avritzer 2006; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011; Goldfrank and Schrank 2009). By winning control where state institutions are relatively developed, the thinking goes, oppositional or alternative political forces can use them to prove themselves and their programs.

[25] Running poisson regressions on our full sample of mayors (n = 3,383) generated similar results. See Appendix.

However, our results suggest that under certain conditions, governing for the first time in urban, relatively high-state capacity localities may present undertheorized obstacles for alternative forces attempting to launch viable, long-term movements and parties. When alternative candidates win mayoral office, they inherit not only the benefits of a relatively developed local state, but also the burdens. These include—at least in the case of Colombia—the scrutiny of AIs such as the Procuraduría and Fiscalía. If alternative mayors could launch viable campaigns and win office in less scrutinized rural localities like their traditional peers, they might be shielded from investigations and sanctions. However, because they overwhelmingly win office in urban centers, they are instead completely exposed to investigations and sanctions for even relatively minor missteps and malfeasance from day one. Even if *who alternative politicians are* doesn't lead to their disproportionate investigation and sanctioning, *where they govern* might.

We refer to this dilemma as the "urban governance trap." From the vantage point of enforcing the rule of law, the urban governance trap might seem entirely benign, as new political forces should have nothing to fear from oversight and accountability. However, in the remainder of this paper, we suggest that alternative politicians' exposure to investigations and sanctions--even if it comes more as the product of political geography than as the result of politicized justice--raises major barriers to longer-term party-building. Specifically, we draw on interview evidence from Colombia to illustrate two plausible mechanisms through which scrutiny by AIs might inhibit alternative party-building. The first mechanism is top-down, involving the depletion of leaders' time, energy, and financial resources in dealing with AI investigations, while the second involves bottom-up challenges to building reputational capital.

Studies of anti-corruption emphasize that, taken to extremes, the enforcement of accountability norms can grind the policymaking process to a halt (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996). In our interviews with alternative leaders across Colombia, mayors and their policy staff

repeatedly commented on how investigations deprived them of the time, resources, and in some cases the volition, to implement bold policy plans and subsequently re-enter political competition. One top policy staffer from Petro's Bogotá administration explained, "We spent 50 percent of the time responding to petitions for information from the accountability institutions. In the end, even if you're honest you do your work in fear of the AIs, and then what happens? You stop doing things at all."[26] Several members of the alternative political movement, *Fuerza Ciudadana*, in the department of Magdalena spoke to a similar set of frustrations. The movement first swept into office in Magdalena's capital, Santa Marta, on the promise of putting tax collection back in the hands of the municipal government instead of a private company, but its attempts to terminate the existing contract soon triggered a Procuraduría investigation. "After that, I became afraid of signing contracts," stated one ex-member of city government. "Now I let people know, being a public servant is a risk."[27]

Besides sapping public servants of their ambitions to execute bold policies on which they campaigned, interviews also revealed that the looming threat of investigations and sanctions has pushed some alternative politicians to voluntarily exit the political stage. Social movement activists in the Eastern region of Antioquia department were shocked to discover once in municipal office that the smallest administrative oversight could be weaponized by the traditional political class—and turned over to AIs for investigations often leading to harsh sanctions: "Someone's signature was missing from a small contract, or some other formality, and we ended up being removed from office and disqualified," said the former mayor of La Unión, Antioquia, referring to his experience and that of two other independent mayors who rode the wave of the

[26] Interview with Bogotá district government ex-secretary, Yency Contreras, July 5, 2019.
[27] Interview with Santa Marta ex-secretary, Adolfo Torne, August 1, 2019.

Civic Movement of Eastern Antioquia to public office in the late 1990s.[28] "That's how civic political processes are truncated. We all just gave up," he added.

AI investigations can also become an obstacle for alternative political forces insofar as they drain alternative politicians' already typically limited resources. Traditional politicians often turn either to well-established and -resourced party structures or their campaign backers to cover hefty legal defense fees or retain high-profile, specialized law firms. By contrast, when asked if the Alianza Verde was able to offer legal assistance during his Fiscalía investigation, the former mayor of Yopal (capital of Casanare department) explained that the party was unable to provide any assistance beyond strong expressions of support from the party's leadership and national figures, like then-Senator Claudia López.[29] Even more vividly, the former Verde mayor of Magangué, Marcelo Torres, complained that, after his trial was moved from Bogotá back to Magangué, he could not afford to pay for his personal lawyer to travel in time to attend his trial,[30] contrary to the "herd of lawyers" working for his political opponents.[31]

From a bottom-up perspective, AI investigations can also entail heavy reputational costs for alternative forces. Even investigations which fail to produce solid evidence of wrongdoing can lead local voters and external observers to see new, alternative politicians to be no different from the traditional political class. Cristian Moreno Panezo, a Green Party leader who disrupted the dominance of traditional elites tied to right-wing paramilitaries in Cesar by winning the 2007

[28] Interview with Juan Carlos Vallejo, independent mayor of La Unión, Antioquia, from 1998 to 2000, March 3, 2017.
[29] Interview with Leonardo Puentes, Alianza Verde mayor of Yopal, Casanare, from 2017 to 2019, August 31, 2020.
[30] "'Hay una voluntad persecutoria por parte de la Fiscalía': Marcelo Torres," *El Espectador*, September 9, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/hay-una-voluntad-persecutoria-por-parte-de-la-fiscalia-marcelo-torres.
[31] "Exalcalde de Magangué, Marcelo Torres, en libertad tras ser señalado de presunta 'apropiación de recursos,'" *El Heraldo*, April 14, 2017, https://www.elheraldo.co/bolivar/exalcalde-de-magangue-marcelo-torres-en-libertad-tras-ser-senalado-de-presunta-apropiacion.

gubernatorial election (Eaton and Prieto 2017), was investigated on charges later dropped by the Procuraduría but was nevertheless listed as a member of that department's dominant clans in reports by anti-corruption NGOs (Valencia and Ávila 2014, 119-120). Reputational losses can sometimes even go beyond individual mayors under investigation. An ongoing case opened by the Fiscalía against former Yopal mayor Leonardo Puentes has been used repeatedly by members of Álvaro Uribe's Centro Democrático party, and by the former President himself, to accuse the Green Party as a whole of corruption.[32] Reputational costs can be amplified by traditional regional media and compounded by alternative leaders' lack of media connections or independent news outlets.

Finally, AI investigations and sanctions may incidentally inhibit the building of new and alternative parties by preventing alternative politicians from using incumbency advantage to consolidate and advance their political projects. Normatively, this could be a more positive than negative consequence of the "urban governance trap." Because alternative politicians only began to win local office in significant numbers recently, often doing so in large cities where AIs are more active, they have very limited opportunities to practice patronage politics--or at the very least, putting public resources to political purposes entails significant legal risks.

In Magdalena, current and former members of *Fuerza Ciudadana* quietly admitted that they frequently blurred the lines between public, city resources and private resources and demanded kickbacks in exchange for contracts in order to field candidates for national office. Historically, as research by Dargent and Muñoz (2016) has demonstrated, the same tactics helped build Colombia's most enduring national parties and frequently went unpunished. For

[32] "Senador Uribe utiliza al alcalde Yopal para tratar de desprestigiar a Claudia López," *Martha Cifuentes: Noticias y Contenidos*, August 27, 2019, https://marthacifuentes.com/portada/2019/08/27/senador-uribe-utiliza-al-alcalde-yopal-para-tratar-de-desprestigiar-a-claudia-lopez.

Fuerza, however, the consequences of dabbling in patronage politics were much higher. In 2019, one among a series of ongoing Fiscalía investigations uncovered irregularities in contracts to build public health centers, leading prosecutors to immediately place the movement's leader Carlos Caicedo under house arrest and carry out an extensive probe into alleged illicit campaign finance. Although Caicedo was eventually able to regain his freedom and run successfully for governor of Magdalena in 2019, his fledgling political party was nearly derailed.

Our quantitative analysis provided suggestive evidence that Colombia's AIs are not instruments of "lawfare," and do not systematically target alternative mayors for investigation and sanction. Some investigated mayors we interviewed in fact agree that there may be no systematic persecution of alternative forces by AIs.[33] However, alternative mayors may be incidentally—and among Colombian political sectors, somewhat uniquely—exposed to scrutiny by AIs by merit of what is essentially a powerful selection effect. We have referred to this dynamic as the "urban governance trap": territorially uneven accountability institutions and Colombia's political geography combine to place traditional parties and the alternative forces that challenge them--at least most of the time--under different degrees of accountability. Although we have only speculated here about possible consequences of these dynamics, our next steps include plans to theorize and test observable implications. From our data on mayors for this paper, one preliminary yet striking observation is that alternative forces have the most "staying power" in small towns. The majority of alternative municipal administrations (209 out of 250, or 83.6%) that elected alternative mayors during the period we studied did so only once. However, among localities in which alternative mayors were elected at least twice (41 in total), three

[33] Interview with Leonardo Puentes, Alianza Verde mayor of Yopal, Casanare, from 2017 to 2019, August 31, 2020.

quarters (or 31) have a population under 50,000. The average size of municipalities governed by alternative administrations every term from 2008 to 2019 is just 17,304.

Conclusion

This paper made a first attempt to empirically investigate the allegation that Colombia's AIs systematically and disproportionately investigate and sanction politicians who represent an alternative to the country's dominant political forces. Our findings tentatively indicate that while alternative mayors are, on average, no more frequently investigated by either the Procuraduría or the Fiscalía than their traditional politician counterparts, both alternative local victories and AI investigations and sanctions tend to cluster in urban areas: a confluence of factors we refer to as the urban governance trap. We then draw on qualitative evidence from across Colombia to illustrate how the urban governance trap may play a role in explaining why alternative political forces in Colombia have consistently struggled to expand their territorial influence and build cohesive, nationally viable political parties. Although the literature on subnational politics has taken it as an article of faith that large cities are a boon to challengers, oppositions, and political alternatives, we are less certain.

As next steps, we first plan to gather data on alternative measures of local government corruption risk. While the IGA is a start, we hope to find a measure that can more directly proxy corruption, such as data on the location of white elephant projects, which we have petitioned from the Contraloría. It could be that our IGA measures are failing to capture important differences between the presence of corruption under alternative and traditional mayors' local administrations.

Treating alternative mayors' local victories as our dependent (rather than independent) variable of interest may also be a promising next step. We are interested in analyzing whether AI

investigations against a traditional incumbent during a given mayoral term increases the likelihood of an alternative mayor winning office in the subsequent term. It could be that AI investigations against traditional mayors expose corruption to the broader public, and in doing so create special opportunities for alternative candidates to mobilize electoral support.

Finally, our quantitative findings may serve as a point of departure for further qualitative inquiry in many new directions. Our finding about alternative forces' greater "staying power" in smaller municipalities raises important questions: How do the experiences of these alternative mayors with AIs differ from those of their counterparts in larger cities? Are they, for instance, also subject to pressure by local Personerías, yet this oversight does not escalate to full-scale investigations by the national AIs? Relatedly, our work also raises questions about the processes and mechanisms by which different types of officials come to be investigated by AIs. Many of the alternative leaders we interviewed claimed that investigations began as a result of denunciations by political rivals. Could investigations of alternative mayors be more likely to begin locally and then escalate to the national level, while accountability processes against traditional mayors are more often related to audits and other top-down mechanisms? Finally, our interviews with alternative mayors about their experiences with AIs should be complemented with similar interviews with traditional leaders. Do they also perceive AI investigations as politicized persecutions? How do they overcome the obstacles to party building we documented for alternative forces?

Appendix

A: Analysis with matching on municipal characteristics:

Table 4: Determinants of Mayor Investigations by the Procuraduría, Matched Municipalities

	Number of Procuraduría investigations per mayor				
	Alternative Mayors	Aggregate IGA	Additional IGA Controls	Demographic Controls	Interaction Term
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Alternative Mayor	−0.037 (0.081)	−0.043 (0.081)	−0.066 (0.078)	−0.142* (0.069)	−0.234 (0.393)
Aggregate IGA		−0.013*** (0.004)	−0.001 (0.006)	−0.002 (0.005)	−0.003 (0.006)
Internal Control			0.006* (0.003)	−0.0002 (0.002)	−0.0002 (0.002)
Contract Visibility			−0.010*** (0.002)	−0.007*** (0.002)	−0.007*** (0.002)
Population				0.307*** (0.030)	0.307*** (0.030)
Municipal Performance				−0.010*** (0.003)	−0.011*** (0.003)
Royalties				−0.008 (0.021)	−0.008 (0.021)
PIB				0.294*** (0.056)	0.293*** (0.056)
Transfers				0.145 (0.084)	0.144 (0.084)
Distance from Capitol				−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)
Aggregate IGA:Alternative Mayor					0.001 (0.006)
Constant	2.865*** (0.058)	3.660*** (0.233)	3.159*** (0.246)	−5.403** (1.687)	−5.334** (1.718)
Observations	594	594	594	594	594
Log Likelihood	−2,301.738	−2,295.529	−2,275.053	−2,186.292	−2,186.265
θ	1.081*** (0.062)	1.102*** (0.064)	1.177*** (0.069)	1.598*** (0.101)	1.598*** (0.101)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,607.475	4,597.058	4,560.106	4,394.583	4,396.531

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 5: Determinants of Mayor Investigations by the Fiscalía, Matched Municipalities

	Number of Fiscalía investigations per mayor				
	Alternative Mayors	Aggregate IGA	Additional IGA Controls	Demographic Controls	Interaction Term
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Alternative Mayor	0.142 (0.254)	0.147 (0.254)	0.254 (0.244)	0.310 (0.221)	0.383 (1.249)
Aggregate IGA		0.004 (0.011)	0.022 (0.019)	0.0004 (0.017)	0.001 (0.020)
Internal Control			0.018* (0.008)	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)
Contract Visibility			−0.017** (0.006)	−0.010 (0.006)	−0.010 (0.006)
Population				0.632*** (0.082)	0.632*** (0.082)
Municipal Performance				−0.004 (0.008)	−0.004 (0.008)
Royalties				0.067 (0.055)	0.067 (0.054)
PIB				0.233 (0.172)	0.233 (0.173)
Transfers				0.164 (0.274)	0.164 (0.274)
Distance from Capitol				−0.002 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)
Aggregate IGA:Alternative Mayor					−0.001 (0.019)
Constant	−1.109*** (0.182)	−1.341 (0.744)	−2.762*** (0.807)	−14.610** (5.003)	−14.661** (5.123)
Observations	594	594	594	594	594
Log Likelihood	−406.387	−406.350	−395.174	−355.611	−355.609
θ	0.147*** (0.024)	0.147*** (0.024)	0.186*** (0.032)	0.424*** (0.091)	0.424*** (0.091)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	816.774	818.700	800.348	733.221	735.218

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

B: Analysis with full sample and binary DVs (above average procuraduría investigations and one or more Fiscalía investigation, respectively):

Table 6: Determinants of Above Average (16.6 or more) Mayor Investigations by the Procuraduría

	Alternative Mayors	Aggregate IGA	Additional IGA Controls	Demographic Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alternative Mayor	−0.209 (0.132)	−0.145 (0.133)	−0.090 (0.135)	−0.934 (0.780)
Aggregate IGA		−0.028*** (0.003)	−0.007 (0.005)	−0.017** (0.006)
Internal Control			0.001 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)
Contract Visibility			−0.012*** (0.002)	−0.010*** (0.002)
Population				0.650*** (0.046)
Municipal Performance				−0.020*** (0.003)
Royalties				−0.038 (0.027)
PIB				0.405*** (0.068)
Transfers				−0.056 (0.110)
Distance from Capitol				−0.001 (0.001)
Aggregate IGA:Alternative Mayor				0.010 (0.012)
Constant	−0.629*** (0.038)	1.081*** (0.188)	0.423* (0.210)	−8.943*** (2.250)
Observations	3,383	3,382	3,382	3,380
Log Likelihood	−2,175.705	−2,131.174	−2,105.164	−1,886.666
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,355.410	4,268.348	4,220.328	3,797.331
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001			

Table 7: Determinants of 1 or More Mayor Investigations by the Fiscalía

	Alternative Mayors	Aggregate IGA	Additional IGA Controls	Demographic Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alternative Mayor	0.411** (0.156)	0.431** (0.157)	0.464** (0.158)	0.371 (0.870)
Aggregate IGA		−0.008* (0.004)	0.001 (0.007)	−0.016* (0.008)
Internal Control			0.003 (0.003)	−0.001 (0.003)
Contract Visibility			−0.007** (0.002)	−0.004 (0.003)
Population				0.456*** (0.048)
Municipal Performance				−0.002 (0.004)
Royalties				−0.066* (0.027)
PIB				0.228** (0.086)
Transfers				−0.093 (0.132)
Distance from Capitol				−0.002* (0.001)
Aggregate IGA:Alternative Mayor				−0.001 (0.014)
Constant	−1.853*** (0.053)	−1.361*** (0.251)	−1.741*** (0.286)	−5.976* (2.664)
Observations	3,383	3,382	3,382	3,380
Log Likelihood	−1,369.261	−1,367.166	−1,361.875	−1,282.555
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,742.522	2,740.331	2,733.749	2,589.110
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001			

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